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NOTES
ADHERENCE OF THE U.S.S.R. TO THE UNIVERSAL
COPYRIGHT CONVENTION: DEFENSES UNDER
U.S. LAW TO POSSIBLE SOVIET
ATTEMPTS AT ACHIEVING
INTERNATIONAL
CENSORSHIP*
The decision of the government of the U.S.S.R. to join the International
Geneva Convention on Copyright [U.C.C.] can significantly contribute to the
reduction of mutual distrust and, in the long view, to cultural rapprochement
among nations.
While definitely approving this action on the whole, nevertheless, we consider
it our duty to express certain apprehensions .... In the particular conditions of
our country, the law concerning the monopoly of foreign trade could be put to
use. for restricting or even for suppressing entirely the international intellectual
property rights of Soviet citizens . . . . The Decree of the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet, dated February 21, 1973, and published in the press, not only
fails to eliminate the apprehensions we have noted above but instead makes
them still more explicit ....
-open letter by six prominent Soviet intellectuals1
The Soviet Union's current relations with the West present a Janus-
like ambiguity. While encouraging closer trade relationships with the
United States, the Soviet leadership seems equally intent on suppres-
sing internal dissent and disabusing the West of the idea that detente
will engender a freer flow of ideas between East and West.2 At the
same time that Soviet jamming of the Voice of America has ceased,3
concerted attacks are under way to silence dissident intellectuals within
the Soviet Union.4 It is against this shifting and uncertain backdrop
* This paper has been entered in the Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition spon-
sored by the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers.
1. PUBLISHERS WEEKLY, Apr. 9, 1973, at 42-43.
2. See N.Y. Times, May 28, 1973, at 6, col. 2. Boris Stukalin, chairman of the U.S.S.R.'s
State Committee on Publishing, confirmed this view, stating that:
The Soviet Union will continue to acquaint its citizens with the best in progres-
sive world culture. Needless to say, writings advocating war and violence,
immorality, chauvinism and ways of life alien to us will not be disseminated.
3. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1973, at 16, col. 1.
4. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1973, at 3, col. 4; TIME, Sept. 17, 1973, at 45; N.Y. Times,
Dec. 30, 1973, at 1, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1973, at 6, col. 1.
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that the Soviet Union's role as the sixty-fourth member nation of the
Universal Copyright Convention [U.C.C.] will be played.
There exists speculation that the Soviet Union will use its newly-
acquired membership in the U.C.C.5 as an instrument for tighter
domestic and international censorship. Pessimists emphasize the Soviet
history of tight domestic censorship and point to the Soviet copyright
law which permits the compulsory purchase of any copyright,6 a
governmental privilege which has been exercised frequently.7 Many
fear that under article I of the U.C.C. the Soviet Union might enter a
United States court as a copyright proprietor to enjoin the unau-
thorized publication of samizdat8 works by notable dissident Soviet
writers. It is also feared that the Soviet Union's laws requiring Western
5. Universal Copyright Convention, done Sept. 16, 1955, [1955] 6 U.S.T. 2731,
T.I.A.S. No. 3324, 216 U.N.T.S. 132 [hereinafter cited as U.C.C.]. It should be noted
that the U.C.C. is not retroactive and requires U.S.S.R. protection only for unpublished
works and works of U.S. nationals, nationals of other Convention countries or works first
published in a Convention country on or after May 27, 1973. Previously published works
are in the public domain of the United States and U.S.S.R. U.C.C. art. VII. For an
excellent discussion of the U.C.C. and its relation to Soviet and U.S. copyright law in the
first major work on this subject since the U.S.S.R.'s adherence, see J. BAUMGARTEN,
U.S.-U.S.S.R. COPYRIGHT RELATIONS UNDER THE UNIVERSAL COPYRIGHT CONVENTION(Practising Law Institute Patent, Copyright, Trademark and Literary Property Practice
Handbook No. 3, 1973) [hereinafter cited as J. BAUMGARTEN].
6. There is no single "Soviet Copyright Law." This note bases its analysis on Chapter
IV of the 1961 "Bases of Legislation in Respect of Civil Law in the U.S.S.R. and
Federated Republics." J. BAUMGARTEN, supra note 5, at 65-67. Article 106 reads as
follows:
The State may compulsorily purchase the copyright to the publication, public
performance or other utilisation [sic] from the author or his heirs by the
procedure laid down in the legislation of the Union Republics.
S. LEVITSKY, INTRODUCTION TO SOVIET COPYRIGHT LAW 274 (Law in Eastern Europe No.
8) (1964). See J. BAUMGARTEN, supra note 5, at 114 n.317.
7. See Wolfiian, 71)Z -Authr -" theS'tate. An A nalysis "of Soviet Copyright Law, 14 ASCAP
COPYRIGHT LAW SYMPOsIUM 1, 19-20 (American Society of Composers, Authors and
Publishers 1966) [hereinafter cited as ASCAP No. FoURTEEN]. Article 106 derives from a
1918 decree empowering the revolutionary government to declare a state monopoly of
"all works of science, literature, music, or fine arts of any kind, whether published or not,
no matter in whose possession they are." Decreee of Nov. 26, 1918, as quoted in
Woltman, id. at 18-19. In the 1920's this decree was the basis for the nationalization of
works by such great Russians as Moussorgsky, Tchaikovsky, Gogol, Pushkin, Tolstoi,
Turgenev, and Chekhov. By a 1925 official decree, the State even nationalized all
Russian translations of the works of Upton Sinclair. The decree was formalized as an
article in the 1928 Federal Copyright Law but was not frequently exercised again until
the late 1950's, when it was turned against "loafing" heirs of popular writers. But see
Matveev, Copyright Protection in the U.S.S.R., 20 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y. 219, 221 (1973)
where a Soviet expert on the 1971 Paris Revision of the U.C.C. states that the State
monopoly on works not in the public domain was not to last more than five years.
8. This term, which literally means "self-published," signifies Soviet literary works in
typed manuscript form which were rejected for publication by the State publishing
houses or were never submitted and are circulated secretly by hand. Solzhenitsyn's First
Circle and Pasternak's Dr. Zhivago are two of the most well-known samizdat works.
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publishers to negotiate with a government literary agency9 would make
it possible for the U.S.S.R. to: (1) refuse translation rights to anti-Soviet
works; (2) request that "correct" translations be made to fit a censored
version of the original; (3) insist that propagandistic prefaces be in-
cluded in certain works; and (4) require that only pro-Soviet editors be
allowed to compile anthologies of Soviet works.10
Optimists belittle these fears, citing Soviet reluctance to enter a
foreign court to seek international censorship, a manifest desire to ease
East-West tension, and the eagerness of Soviet publishing houses to
receive works from the West. 1 Despite these assurances, however, the
fears remain, and unrest has even made itself felt in the Congress,
where possible solutions are under consideration by the House and
Senate Subcommittees on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights.' 2
This note explores three related questions:
(1) Is fear of Soviet entrance into a United States court as a copyright
proprietor in order to enjoin publication of samizdat works justified?
(2) Is concern over heightened Soviet administrative censorship
through the Soviet All-Union Copyright Agency (VAAP) warranted?
(3) Are there any defenses under United States law to possible Soviet
injunctive and administrative censorship? Would a proposed American
9. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1973, at 3, col. 1. The Soviet Union announced the
formation of the All-Union Copyright Agency (VAAP) to act as the authorized represen-
tative of the State publishing houses in dealings with Western publishers.
10. PUBLISHERS WEEKLY, May 14, 1973, at 32.
11. Id. at 31; see also Benjamin, Of Copyright and Commissars: A Rejoinder, THE NEw
LEADER, June 21, 1965, at 19.
12. N.Y. Times, June 3, 1973, § 7, at 39, col. 1; see also 119 CONG. REc. 5613-14 (daily
ed. Mar. 26, 1973) (Statement by Senator McClellan on introduction of S. 1359, 93d
Cong., Ist Sess. (1973)).
The texts of the two companion bills in the House, H.R. 6214, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973), and H.R. 6418, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), which are identical to the bill in the
Senate, read as follows:
In section 9, title 17, of the United States Code, add a subsection (d) to read:
"(d) A United States copyright secured by this tide to citizens or subjects
of foreign states or nations pursuant to subsection (b) or (c), and the right to
secure such copyright, shall vest in the author of the work, his executors or
administrators, or his voluntary assigns. For the purposes of this tide, any
such copyright or right to secure copyright shall be deemed to remain the
property of the author, his executors or administrators, or his voluntary
assigns, regardless of any law, decree or other act of a foreign state or
nation which purports to divest the author or said other persons of the
United States copyright in his work, or the right to secure it; and no action
or proceeding for infringement of any such copyright, or right to secure it,
or common law right in such work, may be maintained by any state, nation,
or person claiming rights in such copyright, right to secure copyright, or
common law rights by virtue of any such law, decree, or other act."
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Publisher's Union solve the problem of administrative censorship with-
out violating United States antitrust laws?
I
THE UNIVERSAL COPYRIGHT CONVENTION
The preamble to the U.C.C. states that the member nations are
moved by the desire to ensure in all countries copyright protection of literary,
scientific and artistic works . .. [and are] persuaded that such a universal
copyright system will facilitate a wider dissemination of works of the human
mind and increase international understanding. 13
The U.C.C. does not grant one copyright, but rather ensures the
granting of copyright protection by each member nation. The conven-
tion provides that each U.C.C. member will accord the same protection
that it gives to works by its own nationals to the works of citizens of
other member nations. The writings of nationals of non-member
countries which are first published in a U.C.C. signatory nation are to
be afforded similar safeguards.1 4 Thus, in essence, the U.C.C. grants
iixty-four copyrights of differing quality.15 Although copyright protec-
tion varies from nation to nation, article I requires that "adequate and
effective protection of the rights of authors and other copyright pro-
prietors" shall be accorded.' 6
Designed for those nations who felt the Berne Convention require-
ments were too stringent,'7 the U.C.C. requires a minimum amending
of domestic copyright law; only the provisions relating to the duration
of the copyright and the awarding of a compulsory license to translate
are explicit. Those who had hoped for Soviet accession to a multilateral
treaty saw the U.C.C. as the only possible solution. Nevertheless, the
sudden decision of the Soviet Union to adhere to the Universal
Copyright Convention came as somewhat of a surprise,' 8 and specula-
13. It should be stressed that the preamble to the 1952 U.C.C. is not legally binding.
A. BOGSCH, UNIVERSAL COPYRIGHT CONVENTrON: AN ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY 1
(1958).
14. U.C.C., arts. I, II; see also A. BOGSCH, supra note 13, at 3-26.
15. Milgram, Territoriality of Copyright: An Analysis of Assignability Under the Universal
Copyright Convention, ASCAP, COPYRIGHT LAw SYMPosIUM, NUMBER TWELVE 1, 15-16,
19-22 (American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers 1963); see Olian, Interna-
tional Copyright and the Needs of Developing Countries: The Awakening of Stockholm and Paris, 7
CoRN. INT'L LJ., 81, 109 n.116 and accompanying text (1974).
16. A. BOGSCH, supra note 13, at 3-5. The Chairman of the Geneva Conference
indicated that the rights conferred on authors by the U.C.C. should include those given
to authors by "civilized" countries. 5 UNESCO COPYRIGHT BuL.., No. 3-4, at 47 (1952).
17. 4 UNESCO COPYRIGHT BULL., No. 1-2, at 10 (1951).
18. N.Y. Times, May 28, 1973, at 6, col. 1. The Soviet Government has been
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tion was rife that some hidden reason existed to account for the
country's sudden change of position.' 9 The theory that the Politburo
desired another weapon of censorship in its pitched battle with dissi-
dent Soviet intellectuals seemed tQ provide the answer, and this theory
gained support with the publication of the decree amending the Soviet
copyright laws as required under article X of the U.C.C.20 This decree
extends copyright to published, unpublished and samizdat works alike
and allows assignment of a Soviet copyright or publication rights to a
foreign publisher only "according to the procedure established by
U.S.S.R. legislation."' 21 Article 106 of the decree, allowing the compul-
sory purchase of a copyright from the author by the Soviet govern-
ment, has been retained from the former copyright law. This leaves
open the possibility that the U.S.S.R. could compulsorily purchase the
copyright to samizdat works and utilize its copyright proprietorship to
sue in the United States courts for an injunction to halt publication. 22
notoriously reluctant to sign any multilateral copyright convention in the past, and from
1917 to 1967 rebuffed all invitations to conclude bilateral treaties. In 1967 the Soviet
Union signed its first bilateral copyright treaty with Hungary and entered into a similar
treaty with Bulgaria in 1972. See Shaye, Piracy Within the Law: A Consideration of the
Copyright Protection Afforded Foreign Authors in the United States and the Soviet Union, ASCAP
No. FOURTEEN, supra note 7, at 226, 230-33 (1964). See also J. BAUMGARTEN, supra note 5,
at 9 n.16.
19. See N.Y. Times, May 28, 1973, at 6, col. 1.
20. Decree of Feb. 28, 1973, On Making Changes in and Additions to the Principles of
Civil Legislation of the U.S.S.R. and the Union Republics, [1973] 9 Ved. Verkh. Sov.
S.S.S.R. Item 138, at 131-32 (Presidium of the Supreme Soviet U.S.S.R.) (unofficial
English translation in 25 CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SovIET PREss, No. 11, at 7 (1973))[hereinafter cited as Decree of Feb. 28, 1973].
21. Decree of Feb. 28, 1973, in 25 CuRRENT DIGEST OF THE SovxET PRESs, No. 11, at 8(1973).
22. Washington Post, Mar. 23, 1973, at 14, col. 1; N.Y. Times, May 28, 1973, at 6, col.
2. An interesting question arises as to whether the Soviet Union would sue for an
injunction in the federal or the state courts. If a samizdat publication is considered an
unpublished work in the United States, the Soviet Union, as an alleged proprietor of an
unpublished work's copyright, would be suing to protect the work's common law
copyrights (one for each state) and may sue in a state court. It is unclear at present,
however, whether a samizdat work would be considered an unpublished work. A British
court recently held the samizdat distribution of Solzhenitsyn's August 1914 not to be a
publication for copyright purposes. The Bodley Head Ltd. v. Flegon, [1972] 1 W.L.R.
680 (Ch. 1971). Baumgarten suggests that U.S. courts might liken sanizdat works to
"limited publications," but the end result would be no different since the common law
copyright adheres to limited publications as well. J. BAUMGARTEN, supra note 5, at 43-44.
Federal jurisdiction might be obtained, however, on the theory that a construction of the
Copyright Act is required to resolve whether the Soviet Union's practice ef eminent
domain constitutes a valid assignment. See T. B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 828(2d Cir. 1964); Royalty Control Corp. v. Sanco, Inc., 175 U.S.P.Q. 641 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
Federal jurisdiction might also be obtained on the theory that the resolution of the issue
was closely tied to foreign policy, with a consequent need for nation-wide uniformity. See
Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l City Bank, 353 F.2d 47, 50-51 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 1027 (1966). The defendant-might also remove from the state court to the
federal district court on the separate jurisdictional base of diversity of citizenship. 28
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Congress has responded to this threat with proposed legislation
which would nullify any attempt by a foreign government to exercise
eminent domain over an author's copyright in the United States. Two
bills have been introduced in the House and one in the Senate with
identical texts to amend section 9 of Title 17 of the United States
Code.23 The bills add a sub-section (d), which allows a copyright to vest
in the author, his executors, administrators or assigns. Under the
proposed amendment, assignees could acquire title to the copyright
only through the voluntary consent of the author, not through a
foreign government's decree, act or law. It appears, however, that
passage of these bills is not critically needed, since injunctive censorship
is not only politically unlikely, 24 but under United States law is virtually
impossible.
U.S.C. § 1332 (1970). The Sabbatino decision held that federal law governs even at the
state level, where the Act of State doctrine is involved, but left open the question as to
whether the state courts could restrict their scope of review even further than under the
Act of State doctrine. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 n.23
(1964).
23. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
24. Soviet authorities already have sufficient internal power to deal with dissidents in
other ways and copyright injunctions in a foreign court would be a "clumsy and exposed
tool for suppression." PUBLISHERS WEEKLY, May 14, 1973, at 31. See also the translation of
The Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R., Oct. 27, 1960, as amended to Mar. 1, 1972, arts. 69,
70, 78, 190-1 (1966), in H. BERMAN & J. SPINDLER, SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCE-
DURE: THE R.S.F.S.R. CODES 125, 153-54, 155, 180-81 (2d ed. 1972). Article 70 of the
criminal code of the largest Soviet republic prohibits the circulation of "slanderous
fabrications which defame the Soviet State and social system." Article 78 punishes
smuggling of "goods or other valuables across the state border of the U.S.S.R." and could
conceivably be applied to the smuggling of a samizdat novel across the border. Article
190-1 repeats the prohibition of article 70, but provides for imprisonment for up to three
years. Imprisonment under article 70 may not exceed seven years. An unauthorized sale
of a work by a samizdat author might also be punished as a violation of the Soviet laws
establishing a state monopoly on foreign trade. N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1973, at 1, col. 1,
and at 17, col. 5. The stiffest penalties possible might be eight to fifteen years imprison-
ment, plus from two to five years of exile, under article 69. This article prohibits acts
which, in order to subvert trade, obstruct the normal work of a State organization (e.g.
V.A.A.P.).
The motivation of the Soviet Union to adhere suddenly to the 1952 U.C.C. may not
have been due to a desire for another instrument for internal censorship. Article IX § 3
of the 1971 Paris Revision of the U.C.C. provides that "after [its] coming into force...
no state may accede solely to the 1952 Convention." 1971 Paris Revision of the Universal
Copyright Convention, in 2 UNESCO, COPYRIGHT LAws AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD
Item B-i, at 9 (Supp. 1971). The Soviets reportedly were worried about the provisions in
the Paris Revision which expressly protect broadcasting and performing rights.
PUBLISHERS WEEKLY, Mar. 5, 1973, at 47. The Soviet Union may also have felt that the
Paris Revision would prohibit the recent amendment to article 103 of the Soviet
Copyright Law allowing nonprofit reproduction of educational and scientific materials. J.
BAUMGARTEN, supra note 5, at 64 n.17 1. At the time of the Soviet Union's accession, only
five nations had signed the Paris Revision: Cameroon, France, Hungary, the United
Kingdom and the United States. By Aug. 10, 1974, however, the required twelve nations
had signed and the treaty entered into force. 70 DEPT. OF STATE BULL. No. 1823, at 619
(1974). The U.S.S.R.'s haste may have been due to a desire to sign the 1952 U.C.C.
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II
DEFENSES TO A SOVIET ATTEMPT TO ENJOIN A SAMIZDAT
PUBLICATION UNDER THE U.C.C.
It is well established that copyrights have no extraterritorial effect.25
Thus, prior to the Soviet Union's signing of the U.C.C., the grant of a
copyright to a Soviet citizen by his government had no significance in
the United States.2 6 Conversely, the Supreme Court has held that a
foreign statute which would have the effect of depriving a foreign
citizen of a United States common law copyright also has no automatic
legal effect in the United States. 27 The Soviet Union's membership in
the U.C.C. has not necessarily changed this situation with regard to
samizdat works.
Although the United States -recognizes the potential right of a
foreign government to enter U.S. courts as a copyright proprietor,2 8 it
before the 1971 Paris Revision superseded it. Article IX § 4 of the 1971 Paris Revision
provides that "relations between states party to [the Revised] Convention and states that
are party only to the 1952 Convention [Soviet Union], shall be governed by the 1952
Convention." 2 UNESCO, COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORTLD, Item B-i, at
9 (Supp. 1971).
In addition, the Soviet Union disclosed an income tax decree revising a basic 1943 tax
law to authorize a royalty tax on Soviet and foreign authors' works of up to 75 percent.
Decree of Sept. 4, 1973, Concerning the Taxation of Income Derived from Royalties,
[1973] 37 Ved. Verkh. Sov. S.S.S.R. Item 497, at 587-90. (Presidium of the Supreme
Soviet U.S.S.R.) (unofficial English translation in 12 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1517 (1973)).
This strongly suggests that the U.S.S.R.'s need for foreign exchange might also have
played a role in its adherence to the U.C.C.
Finally, since the United States has always accorded common law copyright protection
to the unpublished works of aliens, the Soviet Union, even before acceding to the
Universal Copyright Convention, could have compulsorily purchased the common law
copyright of any samizdat work and sued in the state courts for an injunction of any
infrng.ng U.S. publication. No such attempt has ever been made-a strong indication
that this was not the reason for the Soviet accession to the U.C.C.
25. Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1912); Roberts v. Petrova, 126 Misc. 86,
89, 213 N.Y.S. 434, 436 (Sup. Ct. 1925), aff'd mer., 219 App. Div. 772, 219 N.Y.S. 903(1st Dept. 1927), appeal dismissed, 245 N.Y. 572, 157 N.E. 862 (1927); Mills Music, Inc. v.
Cromwell Music, Inc., 103 U.S.P.Q. 84, 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). This principle is also
recognized in the Soviet Union. M. BOGUSLAVSKIc, VOPROSY AvTORSKovo PRAVA V
MEZHDUNARODNYKH OTNOSHENIIAKH 17-18 (1973).
26. See Palmer v. DeWitt, 47 N.Y. 532, 539 (1872); Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S. 424(1912).
27. Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S. at 433-34. (Public performance of an unpublished
play in England was deemed equivalent to publication in England, depriving the authors
of their common law rights in England. Performance did not constitute publication in the
United States and since the English copyright law could have no extraterritorial effect,
the owners retained their U.S. common law copyright).
28. See M. WHiTEMAN, 7 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 891 (1910) where the
UNESCO Report on Penal Actions in Cases of Copyright Infringement, DACP/2/13
(1963) is reported. The right of a U.C.C. government to sue in a foreign court on behalf
of one of its nationals is allowed in five countries (Canada, Italy, Norway, Spain and the
United States) while fourteen countries specifically prohibit it (Austria, Bulgaria, Cam-
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is unlikely that the courts would accede to Soviet demands for injunc-
tions of publications of samizdat works within the United States. Under
the Act of State doctrine, U.S. courts would be barred from examining
the Soviet expropriation of the copyright existing within the Soviet
Union.29 The courts, however, would not give automatic extraterrito-
bodia, Finland, France, Federal Republic of Germany, India, Ireland, Luxembourg,
Monaco, Poland, Republic of South Africa, Sweden, and Switzerland) (the italicized nations
do not belong to the U.C.C.). The report further notes that even where the country
allows another nation to enter its courts as a plaintiff, as in the United States, the plaintiff
nation must probably waive its diplomatic immunity and subject itself to cross-
examination.
29. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,416 (1964), quoting Underhill
.v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897):
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other
sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the
acts of the government of another done within its own territory. Redress of
grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open to
be availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves.
In Sabbatino, an American commodity broker agreed to pay for a shipment of sugar
expropriated in Cuba from an American-owned Cuban corporation by the Cuban
government. After delivery in New York, the broker refused to pay the Cuban
government's agent. The district court held that the Act of State doctrine did not bar
review of the expropriation, since a violation of international law was involved. The court
also took notice of two State Department letters as supposedly encouraging the court to
review the expropriation (the "Bernstein" exception to the Act of State doctrine). The
Supreme Court reversed the district court's ruling without passing on the issue of the
Bernstein exception by finding that the State Department letters expressed merely a
neutral executive position.
Neither would the Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964
require judicial inquiry into the expropriation in this situation, since the amendment is
limited to cases involving claims of title to American-owned property confiscated in a
foreign state in violation of international law and later found within the United States.
Menendez v. Saks and Co., 485 F.2d 1355, 1372 (2d Cir. 1973); Banco Nacional de Cuba
v. First Nat'l City Bank, 431 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 406 U.S.
759, 780 n.5 rehearing denied, 409 U.S. 897 (1972). The Hickenlooper Amendment to the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 78 Stat. 1013, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1970) reads in
relevant part as follows:
(e) NATIONALIZATION, EXPROPRIATION OR SEIZURE OF PROPERTY
OF UNITED STATES CITIZENS, OR TAXATION OR OTHER EXACTION
HAVING SAME EFFECT; . . .
(2).. . [N]o court in the United States shall decline on the ground of the
federal Act of State doctrine to make a determination of the merits giving
effect to the principles of international law in a case in which a claim of title
or other right to property is asserted by any party including a foreign state
(or a party claiming through such state) based upon (or traced through) a
confiscation or other taking..., by an act of that state in violation of the
principles of international law, including the principles of compensation....
Since there was no majority opinion in the case of First National Bank v. Banco
Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972), its value as precedent appears to be limited to the
facts of the case. Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 461 F.2d 1261 n.1
(1972). It is uncertain, therefore, as to whether a court would review the Soviet
expropriation of its citizen's Soviet copyright if encouraged to do so by the State
Department. Cf. Note, International Law-Act of State Doctrine, 49 WASH. L Rav. 213,
216-19 (1973). In any event, the decision of a U.S. court as to the existence or
non-existence of a Soviet citizen's copyright in the U.S.S.R. would have no extraterritorial
effect. See note 30, infra.
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rial effect to the Soviet confiscatory decree covering property outside
the Soviet Union at the time of the decree's passage, even though
directed against Soviet citizens. 30 As Justice White stated in his dissent-
ing opinion in Sabbatino:31
[F]oreign confiscatory decrees purporting to divest nationals and corporations of
the foreign sovereign of property located in the United States uniformly have
been denied effect in our courts, including this court.
To date, the Act of State doctrine has not been applied to attempts at
confiscations by a foreign sovereign of property located outside its
territory.32
As a foreign confiscatory decree attempting to affect property lo-
cated within the United States (a Soviet citizen's U.S. common law
copyright), the Soviet decree would be recognized only if it were
consistent with U.S. law and policy.33 United States courts are likely to
30. Bhglin v. Cusenier Co., 221 U.S. 580 (1911) (the liqueur trademark "Chartreuse"
was reserved to the exiled French monks who had registered it despite the confiscation of
their vineyards in France); Maltina Corp. v. Cawy Bottling Co., 462 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1060 (1972) (U.S. trademark of nationalized Cuban company held
not affected by nationalization decree); Tabacalera Severiano Jorge, S.A. v. Standard
Cigar Co., 392 F.2d 706 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 924 (1968) (U.S. debt owed to
confiscated Cuban corporation held to have a situs in the United States and therefore
held not to have been affected by Cuban confiscatory decree); F. Palicio y Compania, S.A.
v. Brush, 256 F. Supp. 481, 488, aff'd mem., 375 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
830 (1967) (A Cuban decree confiscating a Cuban tobacco business so as to allow the
Cuban interventors to sue to enjoin infringements in the United States of the United
States trademarks of the confiscated business was denied effect as in violation of public
policy. The Act of State doctrine was held inapplicable since the situs of the trademarks
allegedly infringed was in the United States at the time of the confiscation of the Cuban
business.); Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 293 F. Supp. 892 (S.D.N.Y.
1968) (attempted expropriation of all United States trademarks of nationalized East
German company held ineffective in United States as against U.S. anti-expropriation
policy); Compania Ron Bacardi, S.A. v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 193 F. Supp. 814 (S.D.N.Y.
1961) (Cuban nationalization decree held ineffective to terminate existence of Cuban
corporation in New York); Zwack v. Kraus Bros. & Co., 93 F. Supp. 963 (S.D.N.Y. 1950)
afT d 237 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1956) (members of a confiscated Hungarian partnership were
allowed to sue for infringement of their U.S. registered trademark by the government's
assignees).
31. 376 U.S. at 447. The Sabbatino majority recognized the territorial limitation in its
ruling that "the courts of one country will not sit injudgment on the acts of another done
within its own territory." Id. at 416 (emphasis added). Moreover, the court consistently
referred only to United States property confiscated abroad and returned to the United
States. Id. at 428, 431, 436.
32. Henkin, The Foreign Affairs Powers of the Federal Courts: Sabbatino, 64 COLUM. L.
Rev. 805, 827-28 (1964).
33. Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l City Bank, 353 F.2d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1965) cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966); Menendez v. Faber, Coe & Gregg, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 527,
537 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) modified sub nom., Menendez v. Saks and Co., 485 F.2d 1355, 1364
(2d Cir. 1973); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 43 (1965):
(1) The [Act of State doctrine] does not prevent examination of the validity of
an act of a foreign state with respect to a thing located, or an interest localized,
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regard the determination of public policy as an "unruly horse" and
may be tempted to include the vast body of international law on
expropriation in discussing U.S. public policy.3 4 No violation of inter-
national law will be found, however, due to the settled doctrine that
"acts of a state directed against its own nationals do not give rise to
questions of international law."'35 Even so, ample U.S. law exists to
indicate that the Soviet decree providing for the compulsory purchase
of copyrights violates forum policy. If it is found that the "purchase"
provides inadequate compensation to the Soviet author, U.S. courts
would find the decree to be confiscatory and a violation of the guaran-
tee of due process embodied in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,
and of the specific prohibition of bills of attainder in Article I of the
Constitution.36 Only in the case of an expropriation which is part of a
"scheme of general social improvement" in which the "paucity of
funds" in the government coffers makes it "impossible to carry out
large-scale measures in the name of social welfare," would the court
hesitate to brand such a confiscatory decree as against public policy.
37
In the present case, enforcement of the Soviet decree would not only
lack any bona fide social or economic purpose, it would violate the First
Amendment of the Constitution in an attempt to muzzle dissent
through suppression of samizdat works. Finally, it is hardly likely that
the courts would allow a foreign government to practice eminent
outside of its territory if the act has not been fully executed in accordance with
applicable law.(2) A court in the United Siates will give effect to an act of a foreign state of the
type described in Subsection (1) only if to do so would be consistent with the
policy and law of the United States.
Comment (a) provides a further illustration of the rule contained in § 43:
State A issues a decree nationalizing property of X, a national of A. The
property includes real estate in the United States. In a suit in a court in the
United States, X challenges the right of Y, to whom A has assigned the real
estate. The Act of State doctrine will not be applied.
34. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845, 859, revd 376 U.S. 398
(1964).
35. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 332 (1937); M. Salimoff & Co. v. Standard
Oil Co., 262 N.Y. 220, 186 N.E. 679 (1933); Zander, The Act of State Doctrine, 53 AM. J.
INT'L L. 826, 836 (1959). See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845, 861,
rev'd on other grounds, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); Pons v. Republic of Cuba, 294 F.2d 925 (D.C.
Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 960 (1962); F. Palicio y. Compania, S.A. v. Brush, 256 F.
Supp. 481, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd mema., 375 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir. 1967).
36. Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l City Bank, 353 F.2d 47, 51-52 (2d Cir. 1965);
Habicht, The Application of Soviet Laws and the Exception of Public Order, 21 Am. J. INT'L L.
238, 251 (1927). On the adequacy of the state compensation, see Zobel, Copyrights,
Comrades and Capitalists, 8 COPYRIGHT Soc'Y BULL. 210, 226 (1961).
37. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845, 864, rev'd on other grounds, 376
U.S. 398 (1964).
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domain on a United States copyright, when the U.S. government itself
cannot compulsorily purchase a copyright."
The argument has been raised that if a state measure cannot be
applied extraterritorially under normal conflict of laws rules, the fact
that the measure is contrary to public policy is superfluous. Only if the
court is uncertain as to whether the foreign law is applicable under the
res sitae rule, would it be necessary to consider domestic public policy in
order to avoid applying the foreign law. 39 Although early cases were
decided in this manner, the trend in recent years has been toward
basing the denial of relief to the foreign suitor on a finding that the
decree was ineffective, due to its territorial limitation, and its conflict
with public policy. 40
The recent reliance on this two-pronged attack in order to deny
effect to a foreign confiscatory decree probably stems from the growing
power of the Act of State doctrine. Mr. Justice White touched on this
curious legal development in Sabbatino when he noted that foreign
38. 17 U.S.C. § 8 provides that the "publication or republication by the Government...
of any material in which copyright is subsisting shall not be taken to cause any abridgment
or annulment of the copyright.. . ." This clause does not sanction governmental practice of
eminent domain, but assumes publication by the government will be with "the consent of
the owner of the copyright." H.R. REP'. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1909), quoted in
J. BAUMGARTEN, supra note 5, at 93-94 n.262.
39. P. ADRIAANSE, CONFISCATION IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 154 (1956).
40. In the 1912 copyright case of Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S. 424, the English statute
which would have negated the plaintiffs' U.S. common law copyright if applied, was
deemed strictly limited in effect to the territory of England. In the case of Ingenohl v. Walter
E. Olsen & Co., 273 U.S. 541 (1927), the Supreme Court upheld a British court's ruling that
the American Alien Property Custodian in Hong Kong lacked jurisdiction to transfer
trademark rights secured under the English copyright laws. In neither case was any
reference made to the public policy of either nation. The court in Zwack v. Kraus Bros. &
Co., 93 F. Supp. 963 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), affd, 237 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1956), a United States
case dealing again with trademarks, stressed their concern that the public policy against
expropriation would be emasculated were the confiscatory Hungarian decree to be given
extraterritorial effect. The two-part defense of territoriality and public policy began to
assume a more solid shape in the 1966 trademark case of F. Paiio y Compania, S.A. v.
Brush, 256 F. Supp. 481, 492 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), affld mem., 375 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir.
1967), where the court observed:
It has been said that "a disguised application of public policy may be involved in
the court's treatment of an expropriation of intangible property, which has an
ascribed rather than a physical situs. In such cases the court may strain to find that
the property has a situs outside the taking state, and thus avoid the application of
the foreign law, even if the [contacts] with some other jurisdiction are relatively
slight."
The modern version of the two-part defense of territoriality and public policy can be seen
in the recent trademark case of Maltina Corp. v. Cary Bottling Co., 462 F.2d 1021, 1027 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1060 (1972), where the court ruled that where the foreign decree
purports to affect property located within the United States at the time of the decree's
passage, the decree will be given effect only if it is compatible with the public policy of the
forum.
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penal and revenue laws are denied effect because territorially limited in
scope-and this, without any examination as to their compatibility with
public policy.41 The majority in Sabbatino left open the question as to
whether the doctrine applies to other public laws (e.g., copyright law),
since the Act of State doctrine took precedence in Sabbatino where the
property was confiscated in the taking country. 42 This question remains
unanswered. The Soviet Union might well be denied relief purely on
the basis that the copyright decree is a penal law designed to punish
dissidents, and is consequently limited territorially, and ineffective
within the United States regardless of the question of its compatibility
with U.S. public policy.43 Recent trademark cases indicate, however,
that the Act of State doctrine analysis has been extended to cases of
intellectual and industrial property confiscation, and the two-pronged
attack must be proved in order for the court to deny effect to the
foreign decree. 44
Only in the instance in which the executive branch, under its power
to conduct foreign relations, approves by compact or treaty, or other-
wise ratifies the foreign decree, must the court give extraterritorial
effect to the act of the foreign state, for the action of the Executive
would then be considered to have made the Soviet decree consistent
with the law and policy of the United States.45 In the unlikely event of
an executive validation of the Soviet confiscatory decree, Congress, by
41. 376 U.S. at 450 n.11.
42. Id, at 414.
43. See Baglin v. Cusenier Co., 221 U.S. 580, 596 (1911), where the court cites with
approval the opinion of Lord Macnaghten in the English companion case of Lecouturier v.
Rey:
But it is certainly satisfactory to learn from the evidence of experts in French law
that the law of Associations is a penal law-a law of police and order-and is not
considered to have any extraterritorial effect.
On the territoriality of penal laws in general, see I. SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN, INTER-
NATIONALES "KoNFISKATIONS-UND ENTEIGNUNGSRECHT 59 (1952); P. ADRIAANSE, supra
note 39, at 85-86.
44. See note 40, supra. If the Soviet Union should attempt to enter foreign courts seeking
injunctions of publications of samizdat works, the foreign civil courts would likely reach the
same result as American courts, but, unhampered by an Act of State doctrine as rigid as
that of the United States, they would probably base their denial of an injunction on the
Soviet decree's violation of both national public policy and international law. Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 421 n.21, 449 n.1; P. AD~iAANSE, supra note 39,
at 78-89. See especially Bessel v. Soci& des Auteurs et Compositeurs Dramatiques, [1932]
Trib. civil de la Seine (Judgment of Feb. 14, 1931) in 59 JOURNAL Du DROIT INT'L 114
(Clunet 1932), where a French court refused to give effect to the Soviet decree of Nov. 26,
1918, the forerunner of article 106, confiscating the French copyrights of Rimsky-
Korsakoff and Moussorgsky on the grounds that the decree offended French public policy.
45. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S.
324 (1937); Stevenson, Effect of Recognition on the Application of Private International Law
Norms, 51 COLUM. L. REv. 710, 720 n.54, 724-25 (1951).
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passage of the proposed bill, could supersede the executive agreement
and provide the courts with a legal basis for denying the decree any
effect in the United States.
III
THE SOVIET ALL-UNION COPYRIGHT AGENCY (VAAP) AND THE
POSSIBILITY OF SOVIET ADMINISTRATIVE CENSORSHIP
While the possibility of Soviet censorship by injunction will concern
only the few samizdat works smuggled out of the U.S.S.R., administra-
tive censorship by the Soviet All-Union Copyright Agency could be
applied to the overwhelming majority of books sought by U.S. pub-
lishers from the Soviet publishing houses. Many of these published
works may be slightly critical of aspects of Soviet life, causing the Soviet
copyright agency to consider striking the offensive passages from the
proposed American edition. As the sole contracting agent, 46 the All-
Union Copyright Agency will not find it necessary to become a
copyright proprietor of the work in order to control its publication. It
will merely withhold publishing rights from the Western publishers
until one agrees to publish a censored version. With many publishers
bargaining with a single state agency, the Soviet Union will possess a
considerable bargaining advantage. The publisher most eager to gain
publishing rights will make the most concessions to the Soviet censors.
If an American publisher attempted at this point to publish an
46. N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1973, at 3, col. 1. When the Soviet Union announced the
formation of the All-Union Copyright Agency (VAAP) to act as the authorized represen-
tative of the State publishing houses in dealings with the Western publishers, the new
head of the VAAP made it dear that "[c]ontacts between authors and those using their
works will be conduded through this agency." The following Soviet resolution formalized
this procedure:
The functions of the All-Union Copyright Agency include .... acting as an
intermediary during the conclusion of agreements (contracts) with foreign
juristic persons and individuals on the use of works by Soviet authors abroad
and of works by foreign authors in the U.S.S.R .....
The resolution provides that the right to use (publication, public performance
or other type of use) outside the U.S.S.R. of works by Soviet authors previously
published in U.S.S.R territory can be transferred by the author or his assignees
to a foreign user only through the All-Union Copyright Agency.... Works by a
Soviet author that have not been published in U.S.S.R. territory nor abroad can
be authorized for use abroad by the author or his assignees only through the
All-Union Copyright Agency.
The violation of the procedures established by this resolution implicitly invali-
dates the transaction in question and entails other liability in accordance with
existing legislation.
Resolution of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, "On the All-Union Copyright Agency,"
in 25 CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SovIET PREss, No. 52, at 3 (1974) (unofficial translation).
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unauthorized edition of the Soviet work, the Soviet author or the
VAAP could enter a U.S. court and enjoin the publication. Unlike the
case of a samizdat work, in which authorization for a U.S. publication
would be assumed by a court, since the work had been suppressed in
the U.S.S.R. and smuggled out,4 7 in the case of non-controversial books
published in the U.S.S.R. and offered through the VAAP, no facts
would exist to indicate that the Soviet Union by enjoining an unau-
thorized U.S. edition was not protecting the Soviet author's rights.
The inferior bargaining position of U.S. publishers in negotiations
with the Soviet copyright agency poses the central problem with respect
to both the buying of publishing rights to Soviet works, and the sale of
rights of U.S. works. Before accepting a book to be published in the
Soviet Union, the Soviet copyright agency might request that the U.S.
publisher substitute pro-Soviet editors for anti-Soviet editors, that par-
ticular prefaces be inserted, or that "offensive" passages be deleted. In
the competition between U.S. publishers to land a Soviet contract,
concessions on censorship requests might be the deciding factor.
The French-Soviet copyright experience in the early 1960's illustrates
that Soviet administrative censorship is not just an empty fear. The
French government unilaterally offered to treat the U.S.S.R. as if it
were a member of the U.C.C., receiving in turn permission to sell
French works in one bookstore in Moscow. As one U.S. editor con-
cluded, France's renunciation of the agreement was inevitable, due to
the continued Soviet use of a French-based copyright agency to achieve
effective administrative censorship of Soviet works published in
France.
48
47. Schwartz, The State of Publishing, Censorship and Copyright in the Soviet Union,
PUBLISHERS WEEKLY, Jan. 15, 1973, at 32, 36.
48. Kristol, Of Copyrights and Commissars, THE NEW LEADER, Apr. 12, 1965, at 13:
The Russians established a French organization, run by Communists and
fellow-travelers, to deal with French publishers. This organization chose the
translators and provided "suitable" editorial material: If one French publisher
balked there was always another with an eye on the main chance. There was
only one French edition of One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich (the sole country
where this was the case) and it contained a preface by Pierre Daix, who-until
Khrushchev's Secret Speech-had for years stoutly denied the very existence of
concentration camps in the Soviet Union, and who edits a Communist literary
journal. During the six months from January 1964 through June 1964, when
"modernism" was under attack by the Soviet authorities, translations of Soviet
"modernists" were not delivered to French publishers who had contracted for
them. They were mysteriously delayed until the Party line had softened.
Under the French Law on Copyright of March 11, 1957, all foreigners enjoyed full
protection with the exception of those rights taken away by special disposition. Tournier,
A Reappraisal of the First Seven Years of Application of the French Law on Copyright of March
11, 1957, 11 COPYRIGHT Soc'Y BULL. 295, 300 (1964). Tournier discusses other Soviet
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IV
DEFENSES TO SOVIET ADMINISTRATIVE CENSORSHIP
Should the Soviet Union become intractable in an attempt to abuse
the U.C.C. in order to enforce their tight domestic censorship on an
international level, the U.C.C. itself provides a possible solution. The
Soviet Union, in joining the U.C.C., bound itself in case of dispute with
another member nation, to accept arbitration before the International
Court of Justice. 49 Relying on this condition of membership, the
United States could attempt a diplomatic solution with the Soviet
Union and, if that fails, charge the U.S.S.R. with failure to provide U.S.
authors with "adequate and effective protection," and with a violation
of the spirit of the U.C.C.5 0 No case has ever been brought before the
International Court of Justice under this provision, however, and it is
unlikely that it provides a feasible solution.
It is also possible to oppose extended Soviet censorship by resort to
economic retaliation in the form of boycotts and refusals to deal.
Although this type of defense would probably be ineffectual when
applied by individual U.S. publishers, because of the imbalance in
bargaining strength between such publishers acting independently and
the All-Union Copyright Agency, it could be highly useful when
applied by publishers acting collectively through a publishers' union.
Such a union would afford U.S. publishers a more advantageous
bargaining position and provide a convenient agent for collecting
royalty payments, investigating copyright infringements, and filing
suits to enjoin unauthorized publications of U.S. works. However, a
publishers' union poses the difficult issue of whether its formation and
conduct would violate United States antitrust laws.
A. PROPOSED PUBLISHERS' UNION AND THE ANTITRUST LAxVs
The United States antitrust policy is grounded on three basic stat-
utes: the Sherman Act,5 1 the Clayton Act,52 and the Federal Trade
Commission Act.53 Of these three, only the Sherman Act would apply
abuses which eventually forced the French government to condition its former freely-
granted protection on reciprocal treatment by the author's country. I-d. at 301; Decree
Conditioning Protection, in UNESCO, 1 COPYRIGHT LAWS AND T ,AarrS OF THE
WoRLD, Item 6A [France] (Supp. 1964).
49. U.C.C. art. XV.
50. U.C.C. preamble, art. I.
51. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970).
52. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1970).
53. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1970).
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to the proposed publishers' union.5 4 Under the Sherman Act, the
courts have applied two tests: (1) the "rule of reason" which holds only
undue restraints of trade illegal, and (2) the "per se" rule, which makes
conduct such as price-fixing automatically illegal, without any showing
of a restraint of trade.55
1. Section 1 of the Sherman Act 56
Under the rule of reason, 57 the publishers' union would violate
section 1 of the Sherman Act only if ill effects resulted from its
operation (e.g., price-fixing, limitation of production, deterioration of
quality), and if the union intended to suppress competition. Given the
presence of anticompetitive effects, an argument by the union that it
was merely attempting to reduce the disastrous effect on business of
cut-throat competition would not be accepted as a valid excuse. 58
The publishers' union should not cause any of the above effects. If
the union bargains with the VAAP over the royalties for a particular
work, without attempting to earn excessive profits through price differ-
entials on the less competitive works, no price-fixing should be found.' 9
54. The courts originally took the position that rights to a copyrighted work could be
bought or sold and not constitute "trade and commerce" for purposes of the Sherman
ACL 174th St. & St. N. Ave. Amusement Co. v. Maxwell, 169 N.Y.S. 895 (Sup. Ct. 1918).
A later Supreme Court case overruled these decisions, holding that the Sherman Act
aims at the "restraints" of trade and commerce and not at the "subjects" of trade and
commerce. The Sherman Act therefore limits restraints of trade in "rights" as well as in
commodities. Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20 (1912). The
Clayton Antitrust Act is inapplicable to the sale or purchase of publishing rights, since §
13(a) deals only with commodities and products with tangible existence, such as "goods,
wares, merchandise, machinery and supplies." Tri-State Broadcasting Co. v. United Press
Int'l, Inc., 369 F.2d 268, 271 (5th Cir. 1966); La Salle Street Press, Inc. v. McCormick &
Henderson, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 1004 (N.D. Il1. 1968), modified, 445 F.2d 84 (7th Cir.
1971). The Federal Trade Commission Act would not apply to the hypothetical case,
since its purpose is to enable the Federal Trade Commission to stop unfair methods of
competition in their incipiency, not prosecute the formation of a monopoly. FTC v.
Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 693 (1948).
55. A. NE.AT, THE ANTnTRusT LAws OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 24-29 (2d
ed. 1970).
56. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970), which reads as follows:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is declared to be illegal.
57. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918):
But the legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be determined by. so
simple a test, as whether it restrains competition. Every agreement concerning
trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very
essence. The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as
merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is
such as may suppress or even destroy competition.
58. United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610, 611 (1972).
59. In Buck v. Gallagher, 36 F. Supp. 405 (W.D. Wash. 1940), a state statute prohibited
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By resisting Soviet attempts at censorship, the union would limit
deterioration in the quality of the books purchased or sold. Some
limitation of production might occur if the union refused to purchase
the rights to a heavily censored work, but a court should not find this to
be an unreasonable restraint of trade, since this conduct would not
affect the domestic U.S. prices on other Soviet works purchased.60 By
forming the union, the American publishers certainly would hope to
reduce competition among themselves in order to increase their bar-
gaining power with the Soviets, but the. members should continue to
compete within the union to determine which of them will win the
particular contract negotiated with the Soviet copyright agency.61
Although the publishers' union will not violate section 1 of the
Sherman Act by bargaining as a unit, no exclusive dealing arrange-
ments (where the VAAP is constrained to deal only with the union)
would be allowed. 62 The union must be open to all U.S. publishers who
separate copyright owners from pooling copyrights in order to fix prices, collect fees or
issue blanket licenses, except where the licenses were assessing rates on a per-piece basis.
The Buck court seemed concerned over monopolistic price discrimination where,
through price differentials, the monopoly earns excessive profits on its noncompetitive
artides. See also United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D.
Mass. 1953), affd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). It was a practical necessity for ASCAP
(American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers) to grant blanket licenses for
the use of its repertory, and later consent decrees concerning ASCAP recognized this. As
one commentator analyzed the situation:
The licensing of individual pieces on individual occasions would be a hopeless
task. The composers would suspect discrimination if this were done and the
users would be put to intolerable inconvenience.
A. NEALE, supra note 55, at 421-22. No such necessity exists for the publishers' union, and
setting one price for all copyright licenses would constitute price discrimination by a
monopoly similar to that in United States v. United Shoe Machinery, supra.
60. The publishers' union may not intentionally restrict purchases of Soviet works in
order to raise U.S. market prices for them in the United States. United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). The union must also be careful not to
agree on a range within which purchases and sales will be made, scales of prices to be
charged within the United States, or formulas by which to reach such a price. Id. at 222.
Minus an anticompetitive effect on domestic prices, the possible restriction on purchases
of Soviet works should not violate section 1 of the Sherman Act:
Certainly the law has always attached predominant importance to restraints of
trade which directly influence prices, even to the extent of dealing with other
forms of restriction, such as output restriction, largely in terms of their effect on
price.
A. NEALE, supra note 55, at 33.
61. The publishers may decide to bid among themselves after the union has
negotiated the best possible contract with the VAAP on a particular book, the highest
bidder winning the contract. This system would tend to favor the big members of the
union at the expense of the smaller publishers. One possible alternative would be to have
the publishers bid on the contract before the union negotiates with the VAAP. Again the
large firm would bid very high in order to win the contract, while actually expecting to
pay the VAAP less when the contract is finally negotiated. This problem could be
lessened by requiring the winning publisher to pay the union what it bid, any surplus to
be distributed equitably among the union members.
62. See Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20 (1912).
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wish to enter, since otherwise its superior bargaining power would
constitute an illegal restraint of trade injuring independent U.S. pub-
lishers competing for Soviet business.63 A horizontal allocation of
markets within the U.S., or agreement on a retail price maintenance
system by the union members would constitute per se violations.64
Possible collective boycotts by the union in refusing to deal with the
VAAP on heavily censored books present a more challenging antitrust
problem. Chief Justice Hughes' opinion in Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United
States65 indicates that the provisions of the Sherman Act:
... do not prevent the adoption of reasonable means to protect interstate
commerce from destructive or injurious practices and to promote competition
upon a sound basis. Voluntary action to end abuses and to foster fair competi-
tive opportunities in the public interest may be more effective than legal
.processes.
Justice Black rejected Hughes' position in Fashion Originators' Guild of
America,66 but the facts in that case are distinguishable from those
which would probably arise from the operation of a publishers' union.
In Fashion Originators', the Guild was restraining interstate commerce in
order to end an "abuse" (design piracy) which was not illegal under
U.S. law, and thereby encroached upon the proper functions of the
Congress. In the publishers' union situation, Soviet censorship would
be a violation of both domestic public policy and international law, and
only private action by the union could conceivably end the abuse. In
contrast to the profit motive of the Guild, the union would refuse to
deal only in the face of Soviet censorship. Since only commercial
boycotts are illegal per se,67 the non-commercial refusal to deal in the
publishers' union case should be treated under a "rule of reason"
approach. 68 Although the members of the publishers' union would be
constrained from independent bargaining with VAAP, the resulting
primary boycott6 9 would not be profit-motivated and is consistent with
63. See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
64. United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 612 (1972); Interstate
Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
65. 297 U.S. 553, 598 (1936).
66. Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 468 (1941).
67. United States v. Ins. Bd., 188 F. Supp. 949,955 (N.D. Ohio 1960); United States v.
United States Trotting Ass'n, 1960 Trade Cas. 76,954 (S.D. Ohio 1960).
68. Bird, Sherman Act Limitations on Noncommercial Concerted Refusals to Deal, 1970 DuKE
L.J. 247, 276-77 (1970). Bird concludes favoring a per se approach to noncommercial
refusals to deal, with only a minor exception for cases where access to a facility needs to
be limited. Id. at 283, 287.
69. A primary boycott is a:
... trade pattern in which a number of economic actors at one level of the
productive or distributive process discontinue economic relations with an actor
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U.S. public policy and the U.C.C. goal of ensuring authors "adequate
and effective protection."
2. Section 2 of the Sherman Act 70
Section 2 of the Sherman Act proscribes three separate and distinct
offenses: 1) attempt to monopolize; 2) conspiracy to monopolize; and
3) monopolization.7 1 Although formation of a publishers' union, which
included all publishers dealing with the Soviet Union, could conceiv-
ably violate section 2 on all three grounds,7 2 unless the union adversely
affects competition within the United States, no violation of section 1 or
2 would occur. The Justice Department has indicated that it would not
view such a monopoly as violating the antitrust laws,7 3 and no U.S.
citizen could sue for treble damages absent a showing that he was
within a sector of the economy threatened by the conspiracy, and that
he was proximately injured because of the monopoly.7 4 Assuming no
adverse effects on the U.S. market from the activities of the publishers'
union, no proximate injury to a U.S. citizen could be shown.
or actors at another level, or are willing to continue relations only on certain
terms.
Id. at 252.
70. 26 Stat. 209, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970) reads as follows:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed
guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine
not exceeding fifty thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one
year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
71. Id.
72. An agreement between publishers to form a publishers' union satisfies the conspir-
acy provision and would probably satisfy the attempt provision since they possess
enough power to have a reasonable probability of success. The present test f6r monopoli-
zation found in United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966), would be satisfied
since the publishers' union would have shown monopoly power, plus the wilful acquisi-
tion and maintenance of that power. See Note, Monopolizing Under Section 2 of the Sherman
Act, 30 U. Prr. L. REv. 715-16 (1969).
73. In Comegys, Antitrust and Foreign Commerce, 5 TRADF REG. REP. 50,129, twelve
hypothetical cases illustrative of the Justice Department's position are discussed. The
third and eighth cases closely parallel the publishers' union situation and are not viewed
as antitrust violations by the Justice Department. The position of the Antitrust Division
has been substantiated by Donald I. Baker in Mercantilism and Monopoly-The Alternative to
a Competitive America, an unpublished paper given at a Symposium on Interrelationships
Between Multinational Firms and Governments held at the University of California at
Los Angeles on Nov. 16, 1973, at 7:
Antitrust does not prevent American firms from getting together to sell abroad,
where their efforts do not raise prices in our domestic market. Nor does
antitrust prevent American firms from getting together to buy abroad where
their efforts lower prices in our domestic market (emphasis in original).
74. Billy Baxter, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 431 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 923, rehearing denied, 401 U.S. 1014 (1970).
Cornell International Law Journal
Since the Soviet Union would sustain the anticompetitive effects, an
interesting question arises as to the standing of the Soviet copyright
agency to sue for an injunction and treble damages in the U.S. courts.
The primary purpose of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act is to
protect the public of the United States; the private remedy afforded
under section 15 is only incidental.75 The injury complained of must
involve interstate commerce, either in effect or purpose,76 and absent a
showing of injury to commerce within the United States, even the
VAAP, injured by the publishers' union collective boycott, could not
sue under the Sherman Act.7 7
B. POSSIBLE EXEMPTIONS FROM U.S. ANTITRUST LAWS
Although it appears that the publishers' union would not violate the
Sherman Act unless an indirect restraint of U.S. commerce resulted,
the publishers might wish to secure an exemption from the antitrust
laws before forming the union. The Webb-Pomerene Act 8 provides a
"carefully guarded exemption" for certain export associations, but it
deals only with the export trade in "goods, wares and merchandise"
which excludes sales in licenses (right to publish a book) . 9 The exclu-
sion of rights to publish from the Webb-Pomerene Act has been
explicitly affirmed by the proposed trade bill to amend the Act to
include certain "services," but preserving exclusion of trade in "patents,
licenses . "8... ,0
The President lacks the authority to grant the union immunity from
the antitrust laws,"' but the Congress could authorize the union as a
75. Glenn Coal Co. v. Dickinson Fuel Co., 72 F.2d 885, 889 (4th Cir. 1934); D.R.
Wilder Mfg. Co. v. Corn Products Refining Co., 236 U.S. 165, 174 (1915).
76. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909); United States
v. Sisal Corp., 274 U.S. 268, 276 (1927); Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 288(1952); Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291,
1297 n.13 (1970).
77. A recent case, State of Kuwait v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 333 F. Supp. 315 (S.D.N.Y.
1971), held that the sovereign of Kuwait had standing to sue as a "person" within the
meaning of the Clayton Act. Since combinations not affecting the domestic commerce of
the United States do not violate the antitrust laws, and since the Sherman Act deals only
with injuries to interstate commerce, the value to the Soviet Union of the ability to sue
under the Sherman Act should be negligible.
78. 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1970).
79. Green-Fulton-Cunningham Co. v. Security Trust Co., 4 F.2d 313, 315 (6th Cir.
1925).
80. BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. RaP. No. 608, Text F-I (1973).
81. Consumers Union, Inc. v. Rogers, 352 F. Supp. 1319, 1323 (D.D.C. 1973) (dic-
tum), rev'd on other grounds sub. nom., Consumers Union v. Kissinger, Civil Nos. 1029-72
(D.C. Cir., Oct. 11, 1974).
(Vol. 8: 71
1974] Universal Copyright Convention and Soviet Censorship 91
regulated monopoly along the lines of COMSAT.82 Valid legislative
action resulting in a restraint of trade or monopolization of trade does
not violate the Sherman Act8 3 and the publishers may petition the
Congress to authorize the formation of their monopoly. s 4
CONCLUSION
The greatest problem posed by Soviet adherence to the Universal
Copyright Convention is the possibility of administrative censorship.
The history of the French-Soviet agreement in the 1960's indicates that
administrative censorship through a copyright agency is the probable
Soviet response to a copyright treaty or convention. Although basically
beyond solution until the Soviet leadership's need for internal censor-
ship disappears, the problem may at least be ameliorated. American
publishers interested in dealing with the VAAP should form their own
agency to bargain on a more equal basis. It has been estimated by one
authority that Soviet publishing houses will be busy with the transla-
tions of U.S. works published prior to the May 27, 1973 cut-off date for
royalty-free translations, and that it may be "as long as one or two years
before they will be looking for anything other than very exceptional
new works.18 5 A similar situation presumably exists for American
publishers. This period could best be spent concentrating on the
difficult antitrust issues involved in the organization of an American
Publishers' Union to deal with possible Soviet administrative censor-
ship. U.S. legal experts86 have been tilting at the windmill of hypotheti-
cal Soviet injunctions of samizdat publications far too long.
Robert J. Jinnett
82. COMSAT is a non-governmental for-profit corporation which is subject to the
District of Columbia Business Corporation Act to the extent that act is consistent with the
Communications Satellite Act, 76 Stat. 423, 47 U.S.C. § 731 (1962). In letters to the
President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House, President Kennedy
outlined the need for a commercial communications satellite system to effectively repre-
sent United States private and governmental interests in forming a global communications
satellite system. The President emphasized, however, that COMSAT would be a
"government-created monopoly" and should be regulated by government. 1962 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 2288, 2290.
83. United States v. Rock Royal Co-operative, Inc., 307 U.S. 533, 560 (1939).
84. The Sherman Act was designed to regulate business conduct, not political activity.
To hold otherwise would violate the right to petition guaranteed in the Bill of Rights.
Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 136
(1961); United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 669-72 (1965).
85. PUBLISHERS WEEKLY, May 14, 1973, at 31.
86. BNA PATENT, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHTJOURNAL, No. 191, AA-5 (1974). [August,
1974 meeting of the American Bar Association Section of Patent, Trademark and
Copyright Law in Honolulu, Hawaii, at which copyright experts still harbored the
misconception that the U.S.S.R. need only confiscate a work to bar its publication in the
United States].
